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Abstract 
There is an ongoing process of increasing urbanization of the world population with socio-
spatial polarization in large cities. Such population density increases the competition for urban 
land, arousing crescent ground rent generation from the central areas, where there is greater 
availability of urban infrastructure. The outcome of this process has been an extensive growth of 
these cities, generating costs for the low-income population, forced to take longer trips to get to 
work centers. It is also represents a cost increment for public administration, responsible for the 
expansion of urban infrastructure networks. One among the various instruments to face these 
costs is the urban real estate taxation, which can also fulfill an extra fiscal function, when used 
to regulate land use. 
In this article, we aim to analyze urban policy in Brazil regarding the use of the property taxation 
instrument, arguing its effectiveness in controlling land use. This was an important innovation 
introduced by the 1988 Federal Constitution and it is associated with private property defense 
as long as it fulfills its social function. Under these conditions, the main tax levied on real estate 
assets in Brazil, the Urban Building and Land Tax (IPTU), would be used as an urban policy 
instrument by foreseeing the possibility of using different rates according to the land's condition 
(built or not), its destination (residential or commercial), and also predicting progressive rates for 
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properties that do not comply with the social function. Our study takes as reference 
municipalities with population over 200,000 inhabitants. 
Introduction 
Urbanization process has accelerated throughout the twentieth century with socio-spatial 
polarization in large cities. This population concentration has as one of its consequences the 
increment in competition for urban land which, in turn, generates increasing land rent from 
central areas, where there is greater availability of urban infrastructure. In Brazil this process is 
accentuated from the 1960s, when the population became mostly urban and concentrated in 
major cities, resulting in the creation of metropolitan areas. Since then, the increasing 
urbanization is generating more conurbation, which represents a huge challenge for the local 
urban policy, whose jurisdiction is municipal, as stated in the Federal Constitution of 1988. One 
among the various instruments to face these costs is the urban real estate taxation, which can 
also fulfill an extra-fiscal function, when used to regulate land use.  
In this sense, this paper aims to analyze urban policy in Brazil regarding the use of the property 
taxation instrument, arguing its effectiveness in controlling land use. Although real estate taxes 
in Brazil have eminently fiscal nature, the Federal Constitution of 1988 introduced the possibility 
of its application guided fundamentally by the fulfillment of the property’s social function. From 
this new perspective, the Urban Building and Land Tax (in Portuguese, IPTU) would also be 
applied by an extra-fiscal perspective as urban policy instrument. 
This article is divided in four sections, the first being this introduction. In the second, is 
presented an overview of real estate taxation in Brazil. The third part analyzes data produced by 
the Brazilian National Treasury regarding the management experience of real estate taxation in 
municipalities with a population over 200,000 inhabitants. The last section presents conclusive 
reflections on the discussed topics. 
The real estate taxation in Brazil: an overview of the municipal 
performance 
Despite the complex situation experienced in Brazilian territory, the Federal Constitution of 1988 
defined symmetrical federalism as the model for the political organization of the territory, i.e., in 
which federative entities are autonomous and there is no hierarchy between them. Additionally, 
the constituent transferred to the municipal level of government more responsibilities, like the 
implementation of social policies. Thus, municipalities that were already responsible for urban 
policies began to implement health policies, education and welfare, impacting their budget. 
On the other hand, the Federal Constitution proclaims that the property should be given a social 
ethos and repeatedly introduces its social function in several articles (Article 5, XXII, Article 170, 
Article 182 Paragraph 2, Article 186). In addition, Article 1228 of the Civil Code has added a 
paragraph that expresses the nature of the social function of property1. In this way, the social 
function principle legitimates property rights.  
                                                     
1 Article 1228 Paragraph 1, The right of ownership must be exercised in a manner consistent with its economic and 
social ends that, in conformity with the provisions of special legislation, so as to preserve the flora, fauna, natural 
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Considering the above mentioned, another principle of urban law, which has an intensified 
importance when city problems become more evident, is the one present in Article 2, items IX 
and X of the City Statute (Law No 10,257/2001), which establishes the guidelines of urban 
policy as the "fair distribution of benefits and burdens resulting from the urbanization process" 
complemented by the "recovery of government investments that have resulted in the increased 
value of urban real estate." 
Such guidelines for urban policy should be mainly followed by medium and large cities. It is 
worth mentioning that under the current economic dynamics, following reduction of industry's 
share in the GDP generation, cities have become service economies (Santos, 2012). The result 
is the intensification of socio-spatial polarization, making them hubs that attract capital and 
population. Under these conditions the urban land has become a highly profitable frontier for 
real estate capital. On the other side, housing production is no longer considered a vital need 
and is treated as an asset to be managed (Rolnik, 2015). 
When the appreciation of real estate stems from public intervention, it is necessary to assess 
winners and losers to then impose up compensation mechanisms of the created benefits and 
burdens. From the distributive logic that emanates from those urban regulations, it is sought to 
bring within the reach of the community, not just of individual owners, the effects of urban 
development and to discourage actions contrary to efficient use of spaces with adequate urban 
infrastructure and public services. 
It is in this context that the taxation of real estate should be used not only as fiscal instrument, 
but also to encourage the use of urban land in accordance with the principles of urban law. 
According to the Brazilian Federal Constitution, only municipalities may create taxes on: (i) the 
urban land (in Portuguese, IPTU); (ii) the transmission of real estate between the living (in 
Portuguese, ITBI); and (iii) services of any nature (in Portuguese, ISS). This paper concentrates 
its analysis only on the first two taxes, since they are the ones that focus on urban property and 
can directly impact on land management. 
In the case of IPTU, it is collected annually and, according to the juridical doctrine (Machado, 
2008; Rose Jr., 2005) its function would typically be fiscal, fulfilling the role of obtaining financial 
resources to municipalities. However, the Federal Constitution of 1988 authorized the municipal 
government to require that the owner of underused property must provide an adequate use of 
the land (i.e., according to the land use and occupation act) under penalty of a progressive tax 
rate on the property’s IPTU. This new charging possibility confers extra-fiscal purpose to IPTU, 
which shall function as a government intervention tool, oriented to ensure compliance with the 
social function of property.  
On the other hand, the ITBI is a tax on real estate transfers, including real rights to property. It 
has essentially tax purposes, as it seeks funds to the municipal coffers. It does not take into 
account the contributive capacity, and also cannot be applied progressively. 
Unlike the IPTU, which has its periodic incidence (once a year), the ITBI is collected only when 
the occurrence of a specific legal act, namely the transmission of real estate. Its payment by the 
taxpayer is a necessary condition for the property transfer. Therefore, even municipalities that 
                                                                                                                                                         
beauty, ecological equilibrium and artistic and historical patrimony, avoiding pollution of the air and water. (free 
translation of the original text in Portuguese) 
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do not have robust administrative structures for IPTU management can get a more expressive 
ITBI collection rate. This is because it is not necessary to conduct inspection activities, since the 
taxpayer himself seeks the local government to regularize the real estate transfer. 
Although ITBI does not have a potential extra-fiscal purpose as IPTU, its analysis can help us to 
understand the behavior and the institutional limits of the municipality in the management of 
municipal taxes. That is why we conduct a joint analysis of the two taxes from selected data. 
Application of the IPTU and ITBI in the Brazilian scenario: municipalities 
with over 200,000 inhabitants 
In this section the article analyzes data produced by the National Treasury, in a research named 
Finance of Brazil (FINBRA)2. This information on municipal budgets allows the development of 
a Brazilian scenario for analyzing the case of municipalities with over 200,000 inhabitants. 
Additionally, we also used data produced under 2010 Population Census prepared by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
The hypothesis that we work advocates that the municipalities that have the best technical and 
economic conditions to collect taxes are those where there is a greater economic activity. And 
this activity is concentrated in larger cities, those who feel more need for urban planning tools 
because they experience most demographic pressure by the employment opportunities they 
offer (Santos, 2012; 2014). 
Such conditions are present in the states of the Southeast and South regions, being that São 
Paulo state remains as the "Brazilian locomotive", as it was called in the 1970s. Although its 
weight in the Brazilian GDP has declined since then, still it is the primary productive force in 
Brazil, almost three times more important than Rio de Janeiro state, the second largest 
economy in the country. 
Table 1 presents a brief profile of the municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants 
organized from a regional division of Brazil. 
 
Table 1: Profile of Brazilian municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants (by region) 
in 2010 
Regions 
GDP per capita 
2010 (R$) 
Budget revenue (in 
thousands of R$) 
2010 
IPTU collection (in 
thousands of R$) 
2010 
ITBI collection 
(in thousands of 
R$) 2010 
North 17,295.87 7,444,455.89 148,019.34 68,134.98 
Midwest 18,472.56 5,982,139.30 482,424.23 170,608.91 
Northeast 14,497.82 21,852,795.48 919,982.09 449,506.71 
Southeast 30,864.04 101,686,070.64 9,495,705.31 2,558,485.03 
                                                     
2 http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/pt_PT/contas-anuais (Accessed November 21th, 2015). 
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South 27,424.82 18,231,451.51 1,197,816.58 567,976.62 
Brazil 25,574.89 155,196,912.83 12,243,947.55 3,814,712.25 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2010 and the IBGE population census, 
2010 
 
As the data indicate, Southeast and South regions have a GDP per capita much higher than the 
other regions, above the national average. This situation confirms the previous statement that 
this portion of the territory concentrates significant amount of the country’s productive force. 
Southeast not only leads the GDP per capita, but also has the largest budget revenues among 
all regions, representing two-thirds of the total collected (among cities with over 200,000 
inhabitants). This result is largely a reflection of the collection capacity that these territories 
have. So is also concentrated in Southeast the highest amount actually collected from IPTU and 
ITBI. Those discrepant results indicate not only a high level of inequality in the distribution of 
economic activities, but also the limits and possibilities of the territory management throughout 
the country. 
Table 2 shows the distribution (by region) of Brazilian municipalities with more than 200,000 
inhabitants, and their percentage share in the collection of IPTU and ITBI in 2013, considered 
only this group of municipalities. 
 
Table 2: Municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants (by region) and their 













% over total 
collected 
North 450 10 1.50 2.43 
Midwest 467 7 4.84 7.20 
Northeast 1.794 26 7.25 12.12 
Southeast 1.668 69 73.24 58.82 
South 1.191 21 13.16 19.43 
Brazil 5.570 133 100.00 100.00 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2010 and the population census made by 
IBGE, 2010 
 
The largest number of municipalities with a population over 200,000 inhabitants is in the 
Southeast where the municipal network is large, but smaller than the Northeast region which, 
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with its 1,794 municipalities, has only 26 cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. The 
diversified distribution of these large municipalities can be considered an indicator of greater 
regional dynamism of the Southeast in relation to the Northeast. 
Where there is greater share in the Brazilian GDP is also where there are the highest real 
estate assets, such as in the Southeast. Those Southeastern states collected 73.24% of the 
total. It is instigating to note that the participation of the Southeast in ITBI collection is also 
higher than in other regions (58.82%), but less concentrated than in the case of IPTU. Besides 
the Southeast, in all other regions the ITBI collection percentage was higher than the IPTU. This 
result should be associated with difficulties that municipalities face to improve its IPTU 
collection. In the case of ITBI, paid only after real estate transactions, it allows better political 
conditions so that local governments to impose a higher tax basis. 
The significant participation of Southeast municipalities in IPTU collection suggests that its 
administration is best observed where economic activity is greater. It is also where there are a 
greater number of large municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. It is precisely the 
most populous municipalities who need urban policy instruments that have the capacity to order 
city growing. 
The following table shows the evolution, divided by regions, of the percentage share of IPTU 
and ITBI in GDP in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013. 
 
Table 3: Evolution (by region) of the percentage share of IPTU and ITBI in GDP in 2000, 
2005, 2010 and 2013 
Regions 
IPTU ITBI 
2000 2005 2010 2013 2000 2005 2010 2013 
North 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001 0.002 
0.00
4 
Midwest 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Northeast 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Southeast 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 
South 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Brazil 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.17 
Municipalities over 
200,000 inhabitants 
0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013. 
 
The performance of the two real estate taxes as a proportion of GDP in the selected years 
suggests that there is room for improving IPTU administration, especially among municipalities 
with a population over 200,000 inhabitants. After all, there was significant improvement in ITBI 
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collection, which nearly doubled its percentage over the period, while the IPTU collection 
decreased. 
Table 4 shows per capita collection of IPTU and ITBI allowing a comparison of their 
performance at the beginning and end of the decade, when there was census information that 
allowed this per capita calculation. Once again the data on the municipalities are divided into 
regions in order to provide a holistic view of the results. 
 
Table 4: IPTU and ITBI per capita in municipalities with a population over 200,000 
inhabitants (by region) in 2000 and 2010 
Region IPTU, 2000 (R$) IPTU, 2010 (R$) ITBI, 2000 (R$) ITBI, 2010 (R$) 
North 9.27 25.20 2.30 11.60 
Midwest 38.46 131.00 9.12 46.32 
Northeast 21.74 54.56 5.52 26.65 
Southeast 82.76 205.25 14.32 55.30 
South 43.92 131.51 15.68 62.30 
Brazil 59.14 149.70 11.67 46.64 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2000 and 2010 
 
In Table 4, Southeast remains ahead of other regions concentrating the highest IPTU values 
over the decade. However, the same cannot be affirmed when the data on ITBI are observed. 
With regard to this tax, Southern region leads per capita revenue throughout analyzed period.  
It is also observed that although the collection rate of Midwest region is below the Northeast 
(see Table 3), when the analysis is conducted from per capita perspective, the mentioned 
region has almost the same performance of the South (IPTU) and Southeast (ITBI). 
In 2000, Southeast region was the only one that reached a per capita value above the average 
of other regions in the IPTU collection. It stands out the Northern region whose collection was 
more than six times lower than the recorded average (R$ 59.14). Regarding ITBI, the South 
also presented per capita value higher than the national average (R$ 15.68).  
The North again stands out for a very low value (R$ 2.30). This result may be related to greater 
availability of land, reduced volume of legally registered real estate transfers, and a low land 
value. This result is based on the fact that the tax payment is a condition for the legal 
registration of the real estate transfer. Therefore there are fewer management problems as in 
the IPTU case, which – in addition to the legislative dynamics – depends on a more robust 
structure and human resources. 
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Observed values in 2010 suggest that, despite the increased tax collection, the situation among 
the regions in 2000 changed little except for the distance reduction of what was collected (IPTU 
and ITBI) in the Midwest and South in relation the Southeast. 
In the case of the Midwest, the result must be associated with the expansion of agribusiness 
frontiers that despite mobilizing intensive activities in the field also produces direct impact in the 
nearby cities. 
The same observation, in theory, could be made also to the revenue growth in the North. Since 
states such as Pará has been the subject of significant infrastructure investment to export 
grains and minerals produced in the North and Midwest. However, it is possible that a 
significant part of the tax collection in the North and Northeast has not been levied since the 
registry management of real estate located in those areas is very complicated – i.e., many land 
titles were falsified along the time, numerous records overlap, there is no efficient management 
of public lands, many occupations in irregular tenure regime. 
The following tables (7-9) analyze the IPTU management from its relation to the GDP 
considering only a selection of municipalities. 
 
Table 5: The 10 municipalities (with over 200,000 inhabitants) with the highest GDPs per 
capita in 2010 and its corresponding IPTU per capita 
Municipality (State) – 
Region 
Population GDP per capita (R$) 
IPTU per capita 
(R$) 
Barueri (São Paulo) – SE 240.749 115,275.36 55.69 
Vitória (Espírito Santo) – 
SE  
327.801 76,172.11 49.84 
Betim (Minas Gerais) – SE  378.089 74,843.12 52.40 
Santos (São Paulo) – SE  419.400 65,846.53 415.71 
Camaçari (Bahia) – NE  242.970 55,066.69 115.48 
Campos dos Goytacazes 
(Rio de Janeiro) – SE  
463.731 54,585.91 39.11 
Osasco (São Paulo) – SE  666.740 54.577.62 183.60 
Macaé (São Paulo) – SE 206.728 54,506.29 53.31 
Jundiaí (São Paulo) – SE 370.126 54,372.29 184.96 
São José dos Pinhais 
(Paraná) – S  
264.210 51,818.21 55.42 




Municipalities listed above have a population ranging from 200,000 to 600,000 inhabitants and 
the GDP per capita observes an approximate interval that can reach up to R$ 60,000.00 
difference. Meantime, only two municipalities have higher numbers than the average recorded 
for their respective region (Santos, in Southeast and Camaçari, in Northeast). This result is 
probably related to petroleum activities, since there is a petrochemical complex in Camaçari and 
further south there is the Santos Basin. 
Except for Santos it is possible to sustain that despite the high economic performance observed 
in these municipalities, administrative structures for IPTU management in these regions are less 
developed. This is because high GDP per capita observed allows affirming that in such areas 
taxpayers probably have a high contributive capacity due to the presence of mining and oil 
activities. Whereas such potential does not find support in what has been observed in IPTU 
collection, it is possible to argue that the result is directly related to institutional limitations in the 
tribute administration. 
The absence of necessary administrative structures for IPTU administration provides strong 
evidence that its application with extra fiscal purposes is even further detached from reality. 
Beyond the political challenges of implementing measures such as progressive tax rate it is 
necessary to constitute an administrative bureaucracy well equipped and trained to manage the 
tax collection process. As can be inferred from Tables 3 and 4, the ITBI growth is not associated 
with the development of municipal institutions, since the tax payment is a necessary condition 
for the taxpayer to legalize real estate transfers and does not require robust management 
structures. 
 
Table 6: The 10 municipalities (with over 200,000 inhabitants) with the lowest GDPs per 
capita in 2010 and its corresponding IPTU per capita 
Municipality (State) Population GDP per capita (R$) 
IPTU per capita 
(R$) 
Paulista (Pernambuco) – NE 300.466 7,087.90 16.81 
Ananindeua (Pará) – N  471.980 7,775.21 17.76 
Juazeiro do Norte (Ceará) – 
NE  
249.939 7,841.79 7.67 
Caucaia (Ceará) – NE  325.441 7,981.54 11.71 
Olinda (Ceará) – NE  377.779 8,227.06 40.01 
Imperatriz (Maranhão) – NE  247.505 8,563.94 15.06 
Arapiraca (Alagoas) – NE  214.006 8,791.17 5.41 
Magé (Rio de Janeiro) – SE  227.322 9,086.39 24.49 
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Carapicuíba (São Paulo) – 
SE  
369.584 9,279.11 51.30 
Viamão (Rio Grande do Sul) 
– S  
239.384 9,292.77 12.50 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2010 
 
In Table 6, seven of the ten municipalities with the lowest GDP per capita are located in North 
and Northeast. The reflection of regional inequality in economic performance stated above is 
reaffirmed. While population and GDP per capita for this group have smaller variations between 
those found in the previous one (Table 5), IPTU per capita comes to have a range of up to 
seven times from the lowest value identified. Beyond this initial analysis, the observed data 
reinforce the hypothesis that there are better technical and economic conditions to collect taxes 
where there is a greater economic activity. Although in the previous group (Table 5) almost all 
municipalities have collected below the average of their respective regions, in Table 6, none of 
the municipalities collected more than average and the absolute values (except for Olinda) are 
significantly low. 
So, in addition to the lack of robust administrative structures capable of managing property 
taxes effectively, low economic activity also reduces the contribution capacity of taxpayers. As 
an immediate consequence, the revenue generation for those municipalities through real estate 
tax is compromised, and extra fiscal applications of the property tax become only a theoretical 
tool to be applied in exceptional cases, not as urban public policy. 
 
Table 7: The 10 municipalities (with over 200,000 inhabitants) with the highest IPTU per 
capita in 2010 and its corresponding GDP per capita 
Municipality (State) – Region  Population GDP per capita (R$) 
IPTU per capita 
(R$) 
Guarujá (São Paulo) – SE  290,752 14,275.87 638.28 
Praia Grande (São Paulo) – 
SE  
262,051 12,09933 536.48 
Santos (São Paulo) – SE  419,400 65,846.53 415.71 
Niterói (Rio de Janeiro) – SE  487,562 23,000.36 371.46 
São Paulo (São Paulo) – SE 11,253,503 39,418.85 359.81 
Florianópolis (Santa 
Catarina) – S  
421,240 23,280.16 302.41 
Campinas (São Paulo) – SE  1,080,113 33,967.40 270.60 
São Bernardo do Campo 
(São Paulo) – SE  
765,463 46,479.82 252.70 
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Rio de Janeiro (Rio de 
Janeiro) – SE  
6,320,446 30,100.57 226.54 
Santo André (São Paulo) – 
SE  
676,407 25,514.92 222.28 
Source: Elaborated based on a National Treasury research name FINBRA, 2010 
 
Finally, as a last measure of comparative analysis, the municipalities with more than 200,000 
inhabitants who had the highest IPTU per capita result in 2010 were selected. Unlike the two 
previous groups, this set presents a greater diversity with regard its population, ranging from 
approximately 260,000 to 11,200,000 inhabitants. The difference between the GDPs per capita 
is also expressive reaching a variation of more than five times the lowest observed value.  
Among the municipalities listed in Table 7 only one appears in the previous sets, namely Santos 
(Table 5). Already appointed as exceptionality, that municipality seems to fit in a third group of 
municipalities, that is, those where there is a sufficiently developed economic activity and there 
is a organized administrative bureaucracy, able to conduct effective efforts in the IPTU 
collection. In this sense, this set (Table 7) shows that economic activity is an important variable 
and has a direct impact on the tax collection, although there is a clear limit to its interference. 
This statement is based on the fact that nine of the ten municipalities listed in Table 7 are not 
among those with the highest GDP per capita (Table 5). However, they collect more than those 
who observe the highest rates of economic activity. 
Important to note that seven of the ten municipalities analyzed are in the state of São Paulo, 
within municipalities where high economic activity prevails coupled with improved administrative 
efficiency, or in cities that concentrate the presence of vacation homes (e.g., Guaruja, Praia 
Grande), which supposes a population with a high contributive capacity. Given this scenario, it 
is possible to question why Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais municipalities do not have a 
similar performance. A preliminary hypothesis could argue that, in addition to the wealth of São 
Paulo municipalities, this result may be essentially associated with the existence - in São Paulo 
state – of a larger urban network, composed of a much more significant number of cities with 
over 200,000 inhabitants while Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro urban network would be 
polarized around their respective capitals. 
For this third group, in which there is considerable economic activity and high IPTU 
collection rates, its extra-fiscal application seems to be closer to reality. This is because, having 
a population with high contributive capacity, as well as consolidated administrative structures 
able to manage the tax from a minimum level of efficiency, it is possible to see a favorable 
scenario for the use of tax measures from an extra fiscal perspective, as an urban policy. 
Conclusions 
The results of this research point to the same direction of other studies conducted in the same 
area by Cesare (2010), Carvalho Junior (2011) and Santos & Luft (2012). That is, municipalities 
do not explore efficiently the revenue collection potential of the property, but there are other 
essential factors that limit local government possible activities, such as the regional economic 
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inequality and the lack of qualified administrative structures. This situation has as one of its 
consequences the emptying of urban policy content of the IPTU. 
In the scenario examined in this work it is possible to sustain that municipalities are far from 
applying the IPTU from an extra fiscal bias. Nevertheless, promoting its discussion in various 
arenas is critical. This happens mainly due to the slow pace observed between the release of 
an urban policy agenda and its dissemination by society, also due to the role that the State is 
playing with regard to the promotion of social welfare. 
This is justified in so far as, among the family needs, housing is crucial. Apart from its existence, 
its location can determine access to basic services such as, public health, education, mobility 
etc. Thus, increase the supply of social housing is a goal that should guide government actions 
and the property taxation can be an important ally in conducting this task. 
No resource may be dispensed in the challenging task of ensuring decent and fair living 
conditions in a situation where the housing commodification has deepened the vulnerability of a 
growing portion of the population across the planet. 
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